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OPENNESS CAN BE GOOD FOR GROWTH: 
THE ROLE OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Ever since Ricardo’s critique on the Corn Laws to the current debate on 
globalization, few topics in economics have been more hotly contested as the importance 
of international trade openness for economic development.  The arguments in favor of 
openness are well known and date back at least to Adam Smith’s analysis of market 
specialization.  Openness promotes the efficient allocation of resources through 
comparative advantage, allows the dissemination of knowledge and technological progress, 
and encourages competition in domestic and international markets.  Standard trade theory 
captures the gains from openness as movements towards the production possibilities 
frontier.  To this income-level effect, recent theoretical models add a long-run growth 
effect when the areas of specialization promoted by trade enjoy increasing returns to scale, 
as illustrated in the endogenous growth models of Young (1991), Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), Eicher (1993), and Lee (1993). 
  Opposing arguments are not too hard to build.  If market or institutional 
imperfections exist, openness can lead to sub-utilization of human and capital resources, 
concentration in extractive economic activities, or specialization away from 
technologically advanced, increasing-return sectors.  Grossman and Helpman (1991) and 
Matsuyama (1992) provide theoretical models where a technologically backward country 
specializes in a non-dynamic sector as a result of openness, thus losing out on the benefits 
of increasing returns.  Underlying these models there is an imperfection in contracts or in 
financial markets that makes people obey a myopic notion of comparative advantage.   
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) develop a model where specialization in extractive, 
natural-resource sectors prevents a country from the technological progress that eventually 
leads to long-run growth.  In this case, the underlying imperfection is an institutional 
weakness that encourages natural-resource depletion for quick gains appropriated by 
certain groups in society.  Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) review the theoretical arguments 
as to why openness can be detrimental to developing countries; they do so in a second-best   3 
context, in which trade liberalization is the policy lever --and the eventual culprit-- while 
market and institutional weaknesses are accepted as immanent characteristics. 
  The theoretical ambiguity on the effects of openness is reflected in the available 
empirical evidence.  Some papers point to strongly positive growth effects by trade 
liberalization.  This is the case of Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995), who run 
cross-country growth regressions on composite indices of the stance of trade policy; as 
well as Edwards (1998), who prefers to base his positive evaluation by examining the 
robustness of various individual indicators of trade liberalization in cross-country growth 
regressions.  But others, most notably Harrison (1996) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) 
have cast doubt on the significance and robustness of the growth benefits of openness. 
Their critique starts with the openness measures used in practice; for instance, some 
purportedly openness indicators reflect general poor economic management (e.g., the black 
market premium) or are primarily affected by geographic characteristics (e.g., the trade 
volume).  Other criticisms are based on econometric grounds, such as omitted-variable bias 
(particularly due to the exclusion of institutional and geography-related variables) and joint 
endogeneity bias (stemming from the effect of growth on certain policy regimes).          
  Recent empirical studies have addressed these criticisms by emphasizing the over-
time variation in openness indicators and growth performance.  (Harrison 1996 had already 
noted that panel studies rendered a more positive evaluation of the growth effects of 
openness than cross-sectional studies.)  Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Loayza, Fajnzylber, 
and Calderón (2005) run growth regressions on panel data of large samples of countries.  
Both papers use indicators fo openness based on trade volumes and control for their joint 
endogeneity and correlation with country-specific factors through GMM methods that 
involve taking differences of data and instruments.  This implies that, although they 
continue to use cross-country data, these papers favor within-country changes as the main 
source of relevant variation.   Both papers conclude that opening the economy to 
international trade brings about significant growth improvements.  Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003) arrive at a similar, though more nuanced, conclusion from a methodologically 
different standpoint.  Using an event-study methodology --where an event is defined as a 
year of substantial trade policy liberalization-- they find that liberalizing countries tend to 
experience significantly higher volumes of trade, investment rates, and, most importantly,   4 
growth rates.  However, in an examination of 13 country-case studies, Wacziarg and 
Welch find noticeable heterogeneity in the growth response to trade liberalization.   
Although their small sample does not allow for definite conclusions, it appears that the 
growth response after liberalization is positively related to conditions of political stability.    
  This paper starts with the observation that although opening to trade is beneficial to 
economic growth on average, the aftermath of trade liberalization varies considerably 
across countries and depends on a variety of conditions related to the structure of the 
economy and its institutions.  A simple exercise may serve to convey this point.  Figure 1 
plots changes in growth rates of per capita GDP between the 1990s and 1980s versus 
changes in the volume of trade (as a ratio to GDP) between those two decades for a 
worldwide sample of 82 countries.  Figure 1 has four panels; in each of them we separate 
the country observations according to whether they belong to the top one-third (diamonds) 
or bottom two-thirds (circles) of a rank distribution given by, in turn, each of the following 
criteria: a) secondary enrollment rates (a proxy for human capital investment); b) main 
telephone lines per capita (a proxy for public infrastructure); c) a subjective index of  the 
quality of governance; and d) a de facto and de jure index of labor market flexibility.  
(Appendix 2 gives details on variable definitions and sources.)  Each criterion used for 
ranking country observations is measured over the 1980s, the beginning period.   
Dividing the country observations into top and bottom groups allows us to compare 
the corresponding slopes for the relationship between changes in trade volume ratios and 
changes in economic growth rates.  In all panels, the OLS line described by the bottom 
observations is basically flat, implying no relationship between trade opening and growth 
improvement in the bottom groups.  However, this changes for the top groups: for the top 
observations, the slope of the OLS line is positive and steeper than that for the bottom 
group.
1 This clearly suggests that the empirical impact of trade opening on growth may 
depend on the existence and degree of distortions in non trade areas. Of course, this is 
quite a simple exercise and it does not control for other growth determinants (such as 
initial per capita GDP), does not account for joint endogeneity, and does not use all 
                                                 
1 For the top observations according to educational investment, public infrastructure, and governance, the 
slope of the OLS line is significantly positive at conventional levels.  The top observations according to labor 
market flexibility also describe a positive slope that is larger than that of the bottom group, but it is not 
statistically significant.  The more satisfactory methods later in the paper, however, indicate that the impact 
of labor market reforms on the trade opening/growth relationship is in fact strongly significant.    5 
information efficiently. But more careful econometric methods are used later in the paper 
and confirm that the growth response to trade opening is heterogeneous, and not in random 
ways but in relation to specific country conditions. 
This paper studies how the eventual success of openness in terms of growth 
performance depends on the economic and institutional characteristics that make a country 
able to adjust to the new conditions imposed by international competition.  This idea is 
very general, but for concreteness our discussion starts with a simple theoretical example 
where the gains in output after trade liberalization depend on the degree of labor market 
flexibility.  The example is a version of the well known Harris-Todaro model, and labor 
market distortions are represented by a minimum wage that applies to the formal sector of 
the economy.  Trade restrictions are modeled as a tariff that also applies to formal sector 
output.  In the model, trade protection may serve to ameliorate the problem of 
underemployment (and underproduction) in the sector affected by labor market distortions.  
As a consequence, trade liberalization unambiguously increases per capita income only 
when labor market distortions are sufficiently small. 
2 
Our model continues the examination of commercial policy in the presence of 
labor-market distortions (Brecher 1974).  But we regard it, more generally, as an example 
in the tradition of the general theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). From 
this perspective, one should expect similar interactions between openness and 
complementary reforms in other areas. For instance, in the influential work of Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti (2001), openness (in the sense of unobstructed access to technological 
progress) does not lead to productivity improvements in developing countries that fail to 
improve their human capital (to adopt the new technologies) and to enforce intellectual 
property rights (to encourage the development of technologies best suited to their skill 
mix).  Likewise, Banerjee and Newman (2004) have recently presented a model in which  
lack of financial development and sluggish factor mobility make poor countries lose from 
                                                 
2 In the model the potential gains from openness are given in terms of the level of output per capita.  There is 
no contradiction between this static treatment and our empirical emphasis on growth effects.  This is so 
because the time horizons used in current econometric studies do not allow discriminating long-run growth 
effects from long-lasting transitional level effects.  Moreover, the finding of conditional convergence 
suggests that growth impulses coming from improvements in growth determinants tend to decrease as per 
capita GDP increases.     
   6 
trade openness, as unproductive sectors are wiped out by foreign competition but the 
capital and labor attached to them fail to divert to more efficient uses.      
  We then present some cross-country empirical evidence on how the growth effect 
of openness depends on a variety of structural characteristics, including some that may be 
subject to reform.  We build on the panel-data growth regressions presented in Dollar and 
Kraay (2004) and Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2005).  As these papers do, we use a 
GMM procedure that controls for endogeneity and unobserved country-specific factors in 
order to estimate the growth effect of openness, as well as those of other policy and non-
policy variables.  We, however, depart from those studies in that we interact the openness 
measure with proxies of, respectively, educational investment, financial depth, inflation 
stabilization, public infrastructure, governance, labor-market flexibility, and ease of firm 
entry and exit.  Our objective for using this non-linear specification is to assess whether an 
increase in openness may have a growth effect that depends on country characteristics that, 
at least in principle, are subject to improvement through economic and institutional 
reforms.  We find that the growth effect of openness is positive and economically 
significant if certain complementary reforms are undertaken.  This quantitative assessment 
may contribute towards identifying the specific reforms that are most needed to 
complement a trade liberalization agenda. 
  The empirical growth literature offers some examples of non-linear specifications 
considering interaction effects.  On the related topic of foreign direct investment, 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) and Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek 
(forthcoming) find that the growth effect of FDI is significantly positive only when the 
host country has, respectively, sufficiently high human capital and financial depth.   
Specifically in the analysis of growth effects of trade openness, an important antecedent of 
our work is the empirical study by Bolaky and Freund (2004).  Using cross-country 
regressions in levels and changes of per capita GDP and controlling for simultaneity via 
external instruments, they find that trade opening promotes economic growth only in 
countries that are not excessively regulated.  They argue that in highly regulated countries, 
growth does not accompany trade openness because resources are prevented from flowing 
to the most productive sectors and firms, and trade is likely to occur in goods where 
comparative advantage is actually missing.  Finally, Calderón, Loayza, and Schmidt-  7 
Hebbel (2004) interact in their panel growth regressions a measure of openness (volume of 
trade / GDP) with linear and quadratic terms of GDP per capita, which they regard as 
proxy for overall development.  They find that the growth effect of trade opening is nearly 
zero for low levels of per capita GDP, increases at a decreasing rate as income rises, and 
reaches a maximum at high levels of income.  Our strategy of interacting openness with 
specific country characteristics is, to some extent, an attempt to decipher what lies behind 
the dependence of the growth effect of openness on economic reform and development. 
  In section 2, we present a theoretical model to illustrate the ambiguous effect of 
trade opening once labor-market rigidities are present.  Section 3 is devoted to the 
empirical analysis.  There, we first introduce the sample and methodology, and then we 
present the econometric results, illustrating them with straightforward simulations.  In 
section 4 we offer some concluding remarks.  
 
2. AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL  
  The basic idea of our work is that economic reforms need to complement each 
other to be effective. This general principle can be derived from several models, and 
indeed one can see it as a straightforward implication of the theory of the second best. But 
we believe that it will be useful to illustrate the principle in a concrete situation. This 
section does just that, in the context of a simple open economy model in the spirit of Harris 
and Todaro (1970).  
The justly celebrated Harris-Todaro model focused on endogenous migration and 
unemployment in the presence of labor market distortions. In our version below, 
distortions in the labor market interact with tariffs or other distortions in international 
trade. We show that, under certain conditions, a tariff reform reduces trade-related 
distortions but exacerbates the labor market distortions. The implication is that the sign of 
the impact of trade opening on productive efficiency depends on labor market conditions. 
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Production and Employment 
Consider a static small open economy. There are two consumption goods, indexed 
by i=1, 2, whose world prices are given in terms of a fixed numeraire. Both goods can be 
produced at home with a simple Cobb Douglas technology: 
 
(2.1)      ,
i
i i i L A Y
α =   i = 1,2 
 
          Labor is the only variable input in production. Home firms are owned by (a 
measure one continuum of) identical entrepreneurs, which behave competitively in product 
and factor markets. Profit maximization then implies that, in each productive sector i=1,2, 
the value of the marginal product of labor will be equal to the wage in that sector: 
 
(2.2)       i i i i i W L P A
i =
− 1 α α  
 
where 0 < αi < 1,  Pi is the home price of good i, and Wi is the wage prevailing in sector i. 
          The price of good i in domestic markets, Pi , may differ from its world price 
(henceforth denoted by Pi*) because of trade policy. In particular, if there is a tariff on 
imports of good i, Pi  > Pi*. A "trade reform" is a reduction in the difference between Pi 
and Pi*. 
   Also, as in the classic Harris-Todaro model, wages may be different in different 
sectors, and there is a minimum wage in sector 1, which is assumed to exceed the wage in 
sector 2: 
 
(2.3)        W 1 = Wmin > W2 
 
 Note that a "labor market reform" would involve eliminating the minimum wage in sector 
1. 
      There are L workers in this economy. Each one chooses whether to work in sector 1 
or 2. Once the location decision has been made, workers cannot move from one sector to 
the other. The critical aspect of the Harris-Todaro model is that, in equilibrium, the number 
of workers that choose to locate in sector 1 will be too large for all of them to be   9 
employed. Hence there will be a number, which we denote by U, of unemployed workers 
in sector 1. Assuming that jobs in sector 1 are distributed randomly among workers located 
in that sector, the probability that a worker in sector 1 is employed is L1 /( L1+U). As we 
shall see, optimal location decisions by workers imply that the expected wage in the two 
sectors must be the same: 
 
(2.4)      W2 = [L1/( L1+U)]Wmin  
 
 By definition 
 
(2.5)      L 1 + L2 + U = L  
 
      Equations (2.1)-(2.5) suffice to describe the production side of the economy. Given 
the minimum wage Wmin and home prices P1 and P2, (2.1)-(2.5) can be solved for Y1,Y2, L1, 
L2, U, and W2; this is indeed the standard discussion of the Harris-Todaro model. 
      To see the implications of a trade reform, we will assume that P1  > P1* initially, 
while P2  = P2*. That is, initially sector 1 is protected. A trade reform, therefore, involves 
lowering P1 towards the world price P1*. 
      What is the effect of lowering P1? By (2.2) and (2.3), a lower P1 must reduce 
employment in sector 1: since W1 is fixed at Wmin, a fall in P1 increases the real wage in 
that sector, inducing firms to hire less workers. It is easy to show that L2 must then 
increase.
3 
Decreasing marginal productivity of labor implies that W2  must fall. But then we 
conclude, from (2.4), that L1/(L1+U) must fall or, in other words, that the rate of 
unemployment in sector 1 must increase. The impact on U, the number of unemployed 
workers, is ambiguous, and depends in particular on the elasticities of labor demand (the 
αi′s in (2.2)). 
                                                 
3 Suppose L2 falls. Then, by (2.2), the wage in sector 2 must increase. By (2.4), the probability of 
employment in sector 1 must then increase, so U  must fall. But then L1, L2, and U would all fall, 
contradicting (2.5). 
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      It should also be intuitively obvious that a lower P1 increases distortions in the 
labor market: this is because real wages in the two sectors move away from each other, and 
hence the initial gap in marginal productivity of labor between the two sectors becomes 
larger. 
          Of course, a trade reform may have beneficial effects as well. To characterize 
those, and to add more precision to the analysis, it may be useful to complete the 
description of this economy, in particular the demand side. To do this, we will make 
specific assumptions about workers and entrepreneurs. 
 
Demand 
The typical worker consumes a Cobb Douglas aggregate of goods 1 and 2: 
 
γ γ γ γ γ γ
− − − =
1 1
2 1 ) 1 ( / C C C  
 
 
          If his final income is I, the worker will choose C1 and C2 to maximize C subject to 
the budget constraint 
 
P1 C1 + P2 C2 = I 
 
      The solution is straightforward: let P denote the minimum cost of a unit of the 
consumption aggregate: 
 
γ γ − =
1




PC = I 
 
and the worker will spend a fraction γ and (1-γ) of his income in goods 1 and 2, 
respectively.   11 
      All workers receive a transfer TW  from the government. In addition, each worker 
has one unit of time, and so his income will include his wage earned if he is employed. For 
simplicity, assume that there is no disutility from labor. 
      Finally, each worker may choose to locate in sector 1 or in sector 2. Locating in 
sector 2 implies that he will earn the wage W2 for sure. In contrast, if he chooses to locate 
in sector 1, he will earn the wage Wmin only with probability L1/(L1+U). Assuming risk 
neutrality, the worker will choose the location that maximizes the expected value of 
income. An equilibrium in which there are workers in both sectors then requires each 
worker to be indifferent between locating in sector 1 and sector 2. This is easily seen now 
to involve that the expected wage in both sectors be the same (equation (2.4)). 
      For simplicity, assume that the typical entrepreneur consumes the same aggregate 
C of goods 1 and 2 as the typical worker. He is assumed to receive a transfer TK  from the 
government, and all profits from production. 
      Finally, for concreteness let us assume that the government levies a tariff P1 – P1* 
on imports of good 1, and no tariff on imports of good 2. The government has no other 
sources of revenue and transfers tariff revenues to workers and entrepreneurs. Then fiscal 
balance requires: 
 
(2.6)      K W
a T LT Y C P P + = − − ) )( ( 1 1
*




a  denotes total domestic consumption of good i. 
          The efficiency losses associated with the tariff are now evident. Since each 
domestic agent spends a fraction γ of his income in good 1, the same must be the case for 
the aggregate, so 
 
K W
a T LT Y P Y P C P + + + = 2 2 1 1 1 1 ( γ ) 
 
 
      Likewise, P2 C2
a is a fraction (1-γ) of aggregate income. And of course aggregate 
expenditure in the two goods must equal aggregate income:   12 
 
K W
a a T LT Y P Y P C P C P + + + = + 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1  
 
 
      Using (2.6)  in the last equation to eliminate LTW +TK  and recalling that there is no 
tariff on good 2, we obtain that: 
 








1 Y P Y P C P C P
a a + = +  
 
          In other words, the value of domestic consumption must equal the value of 
production, both at world prices. Note that this relation must hold for any value of the 
tariff. 
      This perspective helps to clarify the relationship between the analysis of this model 
and the standard analysis of tariffs. The tariff causes a distortion in consumption, since 
domestic agents face the after tariff relative price P1/P2  instead of the world price P1
*/P2
* 
when making consumption decisions. This causes them to choose a consumption bundle 
such that the social indifference curve is not tangent to the national budget constraint line. 
Also, as in the standard case, the tariff causes a distortion on the production side, since it 
increases the relative price of good 1, so domestic production of good 1 is inefficiently 
large. 
      In our model, however, there is an additional distortion in the labor market, due to 
the minimum wage in sector 1. This distortion pushes production of good 1 down; indeed, 
in the absence of the tariff, production and employment in sector 1 would be inefficiently 
low. A tariff in sector 1 reduces the distortion by increasing the price of good 1 and 
inducing firms to expand hiring in that sector. 
      It follows that a trade reform (a reduction of the tariff to good 1) will generally 
reduce consumption distortions but (assuming the minimum wage Wmin remains in place) 
may increase production distortions. In this sense, the success of trade reform may depend 
on a complementary labor market reform. 
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Complementary Reforms and Productive Efficiency 
As highlighted in the previous subsection, the value of production at world prices is 











α α L A L A P Y P Y P Z + = + =  
 
 
where we have assumed that the price of good 2,  P2
* , equals one. 
      Assuming again that a tariff may be imposed on good 1′s imports, the impact of a 







The last equality follows from (2.2) and (2.3). 
      Equation (2.8) is useful to understand the impact of a marginal change in the tariff 
on Z. To understand its implications, assume that there are no initial trade or labor market 
distortions. No tariffs imply that P1  = P1* and the absence of a minimum wage implies 
that W1 = W2 = W, say. Therefore, dZ/dP1 = W[d(L1+L2)/dP1]. But d(L1+L2)/dP1 = 0, 
since labor is fully employed if there is no minimum wage in sector 1. So dZ/ dP1 = 0: the 
marginal impact of a tariff on productive efficiency is nil. This result is in line with 
conventional theory. 
      Now suppose that initially there is no minimum wage, so that again W1 = W2 = W 
and labor is fully employed, but that there is a positive tariff on good 1. The latter means 
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where the last equality follows from full labor employment. So, as expected, in the absence 
of a minimum wage, if there is a positive tariff on good 1, a marginal tariff reduction will 
increase productive efficiency. 
      If initially both a tariff and a minimum wage exist, the analysis is more involved. 































      By (2.2) and (2.3), dL1/dP1 > 0. Hence the impact of a marginal change in the 
tariff depends on the quantity in square brackets, which captures the opposing effects on 
trade distortions and labor market distortions. The term {(1-α2)(L/L2)+α2}¹ is less than 
one, so the term in brackets can be positive or negative. In other words, when distortions 
exist in both trade and labor markets, a marginal reduction in tariffs (keeping the labor 
market distortion fixed) can increase or reduce productive efficiency. 
      Equation (2.9) has, in fact, a straightforward interpretation. The term P1*/ P1 is a 
measure of the tariff on good 1 imports: the larger the tariff, the smaller P1*/P1. On the 
other hand, the distortionary impact of a minimum wage is given by L2/L: the smaller this 
ratio, the larger the RHS of (2.9). Intuitively, the smaller the size of sector 2, the greater the 
discrepancy between the marginal product of labor in sectors 1 and 2, and the more likely 
it is that an increase in P1 will help increasing efficiency, by inducing more hiring in sector 
1 , where the marginal product of labor is higher. 
      The conclusion is that a trade reform (here, a tariff reduction) may or may not 
improve productive efficiency if other policy distortions remain. The outcome depends,   15 
intuitively, on the relative importance of trade distortions and the other policy-induced 
distortions. 
  The obvious but significant corollary is that trade liberalization will not, in general, 
have an unambiguous effect on productive efficiency. In this model, in fact, trade 
liberalization will reduce productive efficiency if the labor market distortion is 
pronounced, but it will increase efficiency if the labor market distortion is mild. This 
indicates the need to include a term for the interaction between trade opening and labor 
market distortions in assessing the empirical connection between trade opening and 
growth.  
  The discussion in this section has focused on the links between trade liberalization 
and labor market reforms, but it should be apparent that the essence of the analysis can be 
extended to analyze the complementarity between trade opening and other reforms. 
Keeping this in mind, we now turn to an empirical evaluation of the complementarity of 
trade reform and other reforms.  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The objective of the empirical section is to examine how the growth effect of 
openness may depend on a variety of country characteristics, including some that can be 
changed by policy.  For this purpose, we work with pooled cross-country and time-series 
data, focusing on comparative information from within-country changes.  We start with a 
linear growth regression specification and then extend it to account for interaction terms 
between an openness measure and proxies for various country characteristics.  These are 
educational investment, financial depth, macroeconomic price stability, public 
infrastructure, governance, labor-market flexibility, ease of firm entry, and ease of firm 
exit.   We build on the panel-data growth regression literature that uses a GMM procedure 
to control for endogeneity and unobserved country-specific factors, as presented for 
example in Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Levine, Loayza, Beck (2000).  Further details on 
the methodology are given below. 
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3.1. Sample and Regression Specification 
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel dataset that comprises 82 countries.  
For each of them, the dataset includes at most 8 observations, consisting of non-
overlapping 5-year averages spanning the 1960-2000 period.  The sample includes 22 
developed countries and 60 developing ones.  Among the latter, 18 are from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 12 from Asia, 9 from the Middle East and North Africa, and 21 from Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  Appendix 1 provides the full list of countries in the sample.   
The basic regression equation to be estimated is the following 
 
  ' , , 2 , 1 1 , 0 1 , , t i i t t i t i t i t i t i OP CV y y y ε η µ β β β + + + + + = − − −
r
     (3.1) 
 
where the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively; y is the log of 
GDP per capita, CV is a set of control variables, and OP represents trade openness; µ t and 
η i denote unobserved time- and country-specific effects, respectively; and ε  is the 
regression residual.   
As is standard in the literature, the dependent variable is the average rate of real per 
capita GDP growth (i.e., the log difference of GDP per capita normalized by the length of 
the period).  The regression equation is dynamic in the sense that it includes the initial 
level of per capita GDP as an explanatory variable.  Our measure of trade openness is the 
(structure-adjusted) ratio of real exports and imports to real GDP.  We select the set of 
control variables considering both their importance as growth determinants per se and their 
potential for affecting the growth response of trade opening.  The control set includes 
variables that vary both across countries and over time, as well as variables that vary only 
across countries (that is, assumed constant over time).  Among the former, we have the 
average rate of secondary school enrollment to account for human capital investment, the 
average ratio of private credit to GDP as a measure of financial depth, the average inflation 
rate to account for macroeconomic price stability, and the average number of main 
telephone lines per capita as proxy for public infrastructure.  Among the variables that vary 
only across-countries, we have a governance index from International Country Risk Guide 
(Political Risk Services), labor-market and firm-exit flexibility indices from Doing 
Business (the World Bank), and a firm-entry flexibility index from Doing Business (the   17 
World Bank) and the Index of Economic Freedom (the Heritage Foundation).  Appendix 2 
provides full definitions and sources of all variables used in the paper, and Appendix 3 
presents basic descriptive statistics for the data used in the regressions. 
We then extend the regression specification by allowing the growth effect of 
openness to vary with the country characteristics represented by the control set.  We do this 
by interacting the openness measure with each of the control variables in turn.  The 
regression equation with an interaction term is the following,  
 
  * ' , , , 3 , 2 , 1 1 , 0 1 , , t i i t t i t i t i t i t i t i t i OP cv OP CV y y y ε η µ β β β β + + + + + + = − − −
r
   (3.2) 
 
where cv represents one of the control variables in particular.  We interact openness with 
the control variables one at a time in order to both simplify the interpretation of the results 
and not to overextend the parameter requirements on the data. 
  The interpretation of the coefficients on the time-varying variables and on their 
interaction term with openness is straightforward.  However, the interpretation of 
coefficients related to the variables that are constant per country requires some 
explanation.  In linear regression models, they are well captured by the country-specific 
effect and, in general, would not be incorporated into the regression specification.  In our 
case, however, we need to include them in the regression in order to analyze their 
interaction with openness.  The coefficients on the constant variables themselves cannot be 
identified unless we have additional information on their relationship with the country-
specific effect or are willing to make assumptions about it.  Nevertheless, in order to 
complete the information set, we include them in the regression as explanatory variables on 
their own whenever their respective interaction with openness is analyzed.  In order to 
avoid confusion, we do not report the estimated coefficients on the constant variables 
themselves but only the coefficients on their respective interaction terms.   
 
3.2. Estimation Methodology 
The growth regression presented above poses some challenges for estimation. The 
first is the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific effects. While the inclusion 
of period-specific dummy variables can account for the time effects, the common methods   18 
of dealing with country-specific effects (that is, within-group or difference estimators) are 
inappropriate given the dynamic nature of the regression. The second challenge is that 
most explanatory variables are likely to be jointly endogenous with economic growth, so 
we need to control for the biases resulting from simultaneous or reverse causation. The 
following paragraphs outline the econometric methodology we use to control for country-
specific effects and joint endogeneity in a dynamic model of panel data. 
  We use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for 
dynamic models of panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 
(1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). These estimators are 
based, first, on differencing regressions or instruments to control for unobserved effects 
and, second, on using previous observations of explanatory and lagged-dependent 
variables as instruments (which are called internal instruments).  
  After accounting for time-specific effects, we can rewrite equations 3.1 or 3.2 as 
follows:  
 
t i i t i t i t i X y y , , 1 , , '   ε η β α + + + = −
r
        ( 3 . 3 )  
 
To eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first differences of equation 3.3:  
 
() () ( ) yy y y XX it it it it it it it it ,, , , , , ,, ' −= − + − + − −− − − − 11 2 1 1 αβ ε ε      (3.4) 
 
Note that by differencing we also eliminate the information provided by the variables that 
are constant over time.   
  The use of instruments is required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables and the problem that, by construction, the new error term, ε i,t – ε i,t–1, 
is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, yi,t–1 – yi,t–2. The instruments take 
advantage of the panel nature of the data set in that they consist of previous observations of 
the explanatory and lagged-dependent variables. Given that it relies on past values as 
instruments, this method only allows current and future values of the explanatory variables 
to be affected by the error term.  Therefore, while relaxing the common assumption of   19 
strict exogeneity, our instrumental-variable method does not allow the X variables to be 
fully endogenous.  
  Under the assumptions that the error term, ε , is not serially correlated and that the 
explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous (that is, the explanatory variables are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), the GMM dynamic 
panel estimator uses the following moment conditions: 
 
() [] Ey f o r s t T it s it it ,, , ; ,..., −− ⋅− = ≥ = εε1 02 3                  (3.5) 
() [] EX f o r s t T it s it it ,, , ; ,..., −− ⋅− = ≥ = εε1 02 3                  (3.6) 
 
for s ≥ 2 and t = 3,…, T.  Although in theory the number of potential moment conditions is 
large and growing with the number of time periods, T, when the sample size in the cross-
sectional dimension is limited, it is recommended to use a restricted set of moment 
conditions.  In our case, we work only with the first acceptable lag as an instrument; that 
is, for the regression in differences we use only the twice-lagged level of the corresponding 
variable.    
  The GMM estimator based on the conditions in 3.5 and 3.6 is known as the 
difference estimator.  Notwithstanding its advantages with respect to simpler panel data 
estimators, the difference estimator has important statistical shortcomings. Alonso-Borrego 
and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1997) show that when the explanatory 
variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for 
the regression equation in differences.  Instrument weakness influences the asymptotic and 
small-sample performance of the difference estimator toward inefficient and biased 
coefficient estimates, respectively.
4  
  To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual difference 
estimator, we use a new estimator that combines the regression in differences and the 
regression in levels into one system (developed in Arellano and Bover, 1995, and Blundell 
and Bond, 1997). The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above.  
                                                 
4 An additional problem with the simple difference estimator involves measurement error: differencing may 
exacerbate the bias stemming from errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches 
and Hausman, 1986).   20 
For the regression in levels, however, the instruments are the lagged differences of the 
corresponding variables.  These are appropriate instruments under the following additional 
assumption: although the levels of the right-hand-side variables may be correlated with the 
country-specific effect in equation 3.3, the differences of these variables are not. This 
assumption results from the following stationarity property, 
 
q and p all for X E X E
and y E y E
i q t i i p t i
i q t i i p t i
            ] [ ] [









       (3.7) 
 
for all p and q. The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the 
regression in levels) are:
5 
 
( ) ( ) 0     ] [ , 2 , 1 , = + ⋅ − − − t i i t i t i y y E ε η        ( 3 . 8 )  
( ) ( ) 0   ] [ , 2 , 1 , = + ⋅ − − − t i i t i t i X X E ε η         (3.9) 
 
Note that in the levels regression, the variables that are constant over time are not 
eliminated; however, there are no available instruments for them based on either their own 
lagged changes (since they are constant) or the lagged changes of the time-varying 
variables (because if these changes are uncorrelated with the unobserved country-specific 
effect, they are also likely to be uncorrelated with the observed constant variables).  
  We thus use the moment conditions presented in equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, and 3.9 
and employ a GMM procedure to generate consistent and efficient estimates of the 
parameters of interest and their asymptotic variance-covariance (Arellano and Bond 1991; 
Arellano and Bover 1995).  However, given the limited size of our sample, in order to 
reduce the risk of overfitting bias, in the regression in differences we use only the first 
acceptable lag as an instrument.   These are given by the following formulas: 
 
y Z Z X X Z Z X ' ˆ ' ) ' ˆ ' ( ˆ 1 1 1 − − − Ω Ω = θ         ( 3 . 1 0 )  
                                                 
5 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences specification, only the most recent 
difference is used as an instrument in the levels specification. Using other lagged differences would result in 
redundant moment conditions (see Arellano and Bover, 1995).   21 
1 1 ) ' ˆ ' ( ) ˆ (
− − Ω = X Z Z X AVAR θ          ( 3 . 1 1 )  
 
where θ  is the vector of parameters of interest (α , β );  y is the dependent variable stacked 
first in differences and then in levels;  X is the explanatory-variable matrix including the 
lagged dependent variable (yt–1, X) stacked first in differences and then in levels; Z is the 
matrix of instruments derived from the moment conditions; and Ω ˆ  is a consistent estimate 
of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions.
6  
  The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. We address this issue 
by considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which 
tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives 
support to the model.
7  
The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term, ε i,t, is not serially 
correlated. As in the case of the Sargan test, the model specification is supported when the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. In the system specification, we test whether the differenced 
error term (that is, the residual of the regression in differences) is second-order serially 
correlated. First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the 
original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk. 
Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error 
term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process of at least order one. This 
would reject the appropriateness of the proposed instruments (and would call for higher-
order lags to be used as instruments). 
                                                 
6 Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following two-step procedure to obtain consistent and efficient 
GMM estimates. First, assume that the residuals, ε i,t, are independent and homoskedastic both across 
countries and over time; this assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is used to produce 
first-step coefficient estimates. Second, construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of 
the moment conditions with the residuals obtained in the first step, and then use this matrix to re-estimate the 
parameters of interest (that is, second-step estimates). Asymptotically, the second-step estimates are superior 
to the first-step ones insofar as efficiency is concerned. 
7 There are cases where the Sargan test statistic cannot be computed given the near singularity of variance-
covariance of the moment conditions.  This arises when the cross-sectional dimension is small relative to the 
number of instruments.  In those cases, of which we have a couple in our econometric results, we have to rely 
only on the residual autocorrelation test.   22 
  
3.3. Results 
Regression results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 shows the results of the 
basic regression with no interaction terms (column 1) and the results of the regressions 
where openness is interacted with time-varying variables (columns 2-5).   These variables 
represent areas where economic reform has been most active; they are human capital 
investment, financial depth, macroeconomic price instability, and public infrastructure, 
respectively.  Table 2 shows the regression results where openness is interacted with time-
invariant variables.  They represent institutional and regulatory areas where reform --often 
called of second generation-- has been most sluggish.  They are indices of governance, 
labor market flexibility, firm-entry flexibility, and firm-exit flexibility.  We treat them as 
constant per country because their underlying institutional characteristics vary little over 
time and, partly reflecting this, there is quite limited data on their time dimension.
8   
  The basic regression (Table 1, Col. 1) shows results consistent with the previous 
empirical literature.  Initial GDP per capita carries a significantly negative coefficient, 
commonly interpreted as evidence of conditional convergence.  The proxies of human 
capital investment, financial depth, and public infrastructure have positive and significant 
coefficients, denoting their beneficial impact on economic growth.  Inflation, on the other 
hand, carries a negative coefficient, indicating the negative consequence of 
macroeconomic price instability.  Trade openness is also a significant explanatory variable; 
as in other studies that rely on the cross-country variation of within-country changes, trade 
openness is found to have a positive impact on economic growth.  Since in this basic 
specification only linear effects are allowed, the estimated openness impact on growth is an 
average effect; below we attempt to uncover what is behind this average.  The period shifts 
indicate that international conditions for growth have deteriorated over time, resulting in 
considerably poorer conditions in the 1980s and 1990s than in the previous decades.   
Finally, both the Sargan and serial-correlation tests indicate that the null hypothesis of 
correct specification cannot be rejected, lending support to our estimation results.  This is 
                                                 
8 The ICRG governance index is available since the mid 1980s and shows some time variation.  Given that 
we are forced to assume that its value was the same in the 1960s and 1970s as in the mid 1980s, we take the 
conservative assumption that its growth effect cannot be estimated separately from that of the unobserved 
fixed effect, as is the case with the other institutional variables that are completely constant over time.    23 
the case for the exercises presented below, and we mention it only here in order to avoid 
redundancy. 
  Table 1 also shows the regressions results that consider interaction effects between 
openness and time-varying variables (Cols. 2-5).  An interesting pattern of reform 
complementarity emerges: the coefficient on the interaction between the trade volume ratio 
and, in turn, the secondary enrollment rate, the private domestic credit ratio, and the 
number of phone lines per capita is positive and significant.  This indicates that the growth 
effect of an increase in openness depends positively on the progress made in each of these 
areas.  That is, more openness results in a larger increase in economic growth when the 
investment in human capital is stronger, financial markets are deeper, and public 
infrastructure is more readily available.  The shared explanation for these results is related 
to the competitiveness of domestic firms in international markets: when domestic firms 
find a better educated labor force and less costly credit and communications, they are able 
to compete with foreign firms and expand their markets effectively.  The interaction 
between trade volumes and inflation is not significant, possibly reflecting the fact that for 
most inflation values, relative price distortions are not severe.   
  Table 2 shows the growth regression results when openness is interacted with the 
proxies of institutional and regulatory reform.  Interestingly, as in the results related to 
time-varying variables, we observe a pattern of complementarity between openness and 
other reforms: the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the trade volume ratio 
and, in turn, the proxies for governance, labor-market flexibility, and firm-entry flexibility 
are positive and statistically significant.  The beneficial impact of an increase in trade 
openness on economic growth is larger when society has a more efficient, accountable, and 
honest government and where the rule of law is more respected.  Likewise, the positive 
growth effect of trade opening is stronger when flexible labor markets make it easier for 
domestic firms to transform and adjust to changing environments, particularly those in 
highly competitive foreign markets.  Our results also point out the importance of 
unrestricted firm renewal in order for trade opening to have a positive growth impact, 
particularly regarding the firm-entry margin.  The interaction term between openness and 
firm-exit flexibility is, however, not significant; whether this reflects data-quality problems 
or a more substantial difference with the opposite margin of firm dynamics is unclear.           24 
The preceding discussion focuses on the interaction terms; however, in order to 
ascertain whether the total impact of a change in openness leads to higher or lower growth, 
we need to consider the coefficients on both the interaction term and the openness variable 
itself.  Since the total impact depends on the values of the variables with which openness is 
interacted, it is not really informative to provide a single summary measure of the effect.  
Instead, it may be best to show how the growth effect of a change in openness varies for 
different levels of the other reform variables.  We do so in Figure 2.  Specifically, this 
figure presents the total effect on economic growth of a one-standard-deviation change in 
the openness measure for each value that a given complementary reform can take in the 
sample.  Since only linear interaction effects are considered, the growth effect of openness 
can be represented as a linear function of each complementary reform.  In addition to total 
growth effects (based on the coefficient point estimates), the figure shows the 
corresponding 90% confidence bands (constructed with the estimated coefficient standard 
errors).
9  Figure 2 has six panels, each corresponding to a reform variable whose 
interaction with openness is statistically significant.  For time-varying variables, the range 
of values corresponding to the latest period (1996-2000) is found towards the higher values 
of the full (all-periods) range; since for current policy analysis the latest values are the 
most relevant, we highlight their range in the corresponding panel.   
For all reform variables except the governance index, the total growth impact of 
openness changes from negative to positive as progress occurs.  Therefore, in principle, an 
increase in openness could bring a reduction in economic growth if a given complementary 
area is not sufficiently advanced.  In practice, given the current state of reform progress 
around the world, this concern is presently relevant for half the complementary areas under 
consideration.  For educational enrollment, financial development, and governance, our 
                                                 
9 From our regression model, the growth effect of openness is given by,  
∆Growth = (βOPEN + βINT REF) ∆Openness 
where  βOPEN  and  βINT  are, respectively, the estimated regression coefficients on openness and on the 
interaction between openness and a given complementary reform variable (REF).  Note that ∆Openness is an 
arbitrary constant (set to equal one sample standard deviation of the openness measure) and REF follows a 
fixed set of values (and can thus be treated as a constant at any given point along its sample range).  Then, 
the confidence intervals can be constructed from the following expression for the variance of the growth 
effect,  
Var[∆Growth] = {Var(βOPEN)+Var(βINT) REF 
2 + Cov (βOPEN , βINT) REF} {∆Openness}
2 
where the variances and covariances of the estimated coefficients are obtained from our panel estimation 
method. 
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results indicate that they would not cause growth to decline with increased openness given 
that their current values in most countries exceed the corresponding threshold.  However, 
regarding infrastructure, labor market flexibility, and firm entry flexibility, there are many 
countries that currently stand to lose from opening their markets.  Focusing only on the 
reform indicators used in the paper, we can derive the implication that the most urgent 
reforms in order to make trade good for growth are related to infrastructure, labor markets, 
and firm renewal.  This is not to say, however, that countries will not benefit more from 
trade openness if they improve their educational attainment, financial depth, and overall 
governance.                            
  So far we have considered only linear interactions between openness and other 
variables one at a time.  A richer specification would allow for both non-linear interactions 
and interactions with multiple variables at the same time.  The problem with richer 
specifications, however, is that the possibilities are almost endless.  Our limited sample, 
demanding econometric methodology, and the multicollinearity among growth 
determinants prevent us from exploring a full set of interactions.  However, some progress 
can be made by expanding our specification to include the interaction between openness 
and initial income to each of the regression specifications studied above and examining the 
sign and significance of the coefficient on this interaction.  This exercise links our results 
to the literature discussed in the introduction, which finds that the growth effect of 
openness depends on the countries’ level of income.  That literature argues that income 
represents overall development and is thus strongly related to the social and economic 
conditions that improve openness’ beneficial impact.  We find confirmation for this claim 
in the fact that, in our sample, initial income has a 90% correlation with the first principal 
component of our six complementary reforms, meaning that income represents well what 
is common among these development variables.  Therefore, we can analyze whether it is 
the full package of reforms what makes openness better for growth by examining if, in the 
expanded specification, the coefficient on the openness-initial income interaction is 
positive and significant in most cases.  It is also of interest to check whether, after the 
openness-initial income interaction is included, the interaction of openness with certain 
individual reforms remain significant. If so, the effect of those reforms on the openness-  26 
growth relation is independent to that of the other reforms as a whole.  In that sense, they 
would be "more complementary" to openness than the rest.  
  Table 3 presents the main results of the expanded regression specification.  In the 
benchmark (column 1), only the openness-initial income interaction is considered; it 
carries a significantly positive coefficient, as expected and predicted by previous literature.  
In the remaining cases, the interactions between openness and, respectively, educational 
investment, financial depth, public infrastructure, governance, labor-market flexibility, and 
firm-entry flexibility are added one at a time.   
In five out of the six cases the openness-income interaction remains significantly 
positive, denoting that in the majority of cases the combination of all complementary 
reform variables (represented by income) is a key determinant on the growth impact of 
openness.
10  Overall, therefore, our results underscore the benefits of a comprehensive path 
to reform.  
The inclusion of the openness-initial income interaction term makes the 
coefficients of the interaction between openness and human capital investment, financial 
depth, public infrastructure, and governance lose their sign or become statistically 
insignificant. As we have discussed, we interpret this result as suggesting that these 
complementary areas must be addressed as a whole if they are to affect the openness-
growth link.  In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction of openness and, respectively, 
labor market flexibility and firm entry flexibility remain significant at the five percent 
level.  Reforms of the labor market and firm entry conditions appear, therefore, to have a 
significant effect on the impact of openness on growth, independently of other reforms.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS   
As discussed in the introduction, previous empirical evidence on the impact of 
trade openness on economic growth has failed to reveal undisputed beneficial growth 
effects from trade liberalization.  Both the theory and the evidence reviewed in this paper, 
however, indicate that such a failure should not have come as a surprise.  It is not too hard 
to find theoretical situations in which the removal of barriers to trade needs to be 
                                                 
10 The exception occurs when the interaction between openness and firm-entry flexibility is also present. In 
that case, the coefficient of the openness-income interaction term becomes insignificant, although its sign 
remains positive.   27 
accompanied by complementary reforms in non-trade areas if it is to improve productive 
efficiency and growth. And our empirical work finds that such situations may not be 
uncommon in practice.  
One policy implication of our analysis is that the advisability of trade liberalization 
may depend on the existence and degree of distortions in non-trade institutions, as well as 
on the feasibility of removing those distortions. This underscores the need to reject a “one 
size fits all” approach to trade opening in favor of packages that are tailored to the specific 
circumstances of each country.  
This being said, we believe that our findings provide fresh support to the view that 
trade liberalization tends to enhance growth. Our empirical work does confirm that trade 
opening results in faster growth on average, that is, when the interaction effects are omitted 
from our regressions. And if the interaction terms are included, trade liberalization turns 
out to still raise growth, except for countries in which complementary areas are strongly 
distorted.  
In addition, and conversely, our findings indicate that “second generation” reforms 
have not only direct benefits but also indirect ones, in that they allow a country to take 
fuller advantage of trade opening. This is a significant argument in the ongoing debate 
about the gains from more comprehensive reform in developing countries.   28 
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Table 1
Economic Growth and the Interaction between Openness and Other Economic Reforms
Cross-country panel data consisting of non-overlapping 5-year averages spanning 1960-2000
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
     Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -3.1713 ** -3.2036 ** -3.2627 ** -3.2059 ** -3.3552 **
  ( i n  l o g s ) 0 . 1 80 . 2 10 . 1 70 . 1 80 . 2 3
Human capital investment 1.1621 ** -0.8610 ** 1.2105 ** 1.1402 ** 1.2594 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.15 0.42 0.16 0.16 0.17
Financial depth 1.0272 ** 0.9421 ** 0.0262 1.0071 ** 0.9234 **
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.07
Inflation -0.4580 ** -0.4350 ** -0.4895 ** -0.3243 -0.4364 **
  (deviation of inflation rate from - 3 % ,  i n  l o g s ) 0 . 0 80 . 0 70 . 0 70 . 2 10 . 0 7
Public infrastructure 1.5764 ** 1.5904 ** 1.6053 ** 1.6050 ** 0.6423 **
  (main telephone lines per capita, in logs) 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.19
     Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 1.1959 ** -2.0421 ** -0.2553 1.3497 ** 3.2821 **
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.16 0.59 0.28 0.28 0.48
     Interactions:
TO * Human capital investment 1.0031 **
0.18
TO * Financial depth 0.4629 **
0.08
TO * Inflation -0.0725
0.10
TO * Public infrastructure 0.4970 **
0.09
     Period Shifts:
Intercept (base period: 1966-70) 26.6266 ** 33.8398 ** 30.5385 ** 26.8523 ** 24.3839 **
 - 71-76 Period shift -0.2987 * -0.2371 -0.2168 -0.2698 -0.2973 **
 - 76-80 Period shift -1.1300 ** -1.1488 ** -1.0385 ** -1.1052 ** -1.1850 **
 - 81-85 Period shift -3.3327 ** -3.3847 ** -3.2966 ** -3.3011 ** -3.4343 **
 - 86-90 Period shift -2.9064 ** -3.0726 ** -2.9450 ** -2.8904 ** -3.1684 **
 - 91-95 Period shift -3.6060 ** -3.8088 ** -3.6621 ** -3.6020 ** -3.9486 **
 - 96-00 Period shift -4.3282 ** -4.6922 ** -4.4665 ** -4.3250 ** -4.8331 **
Countries / Observations 82/544 82/544 82/544 82/544 82/544
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.47
 - 2nd. Order Correlation 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14
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Infrastructure
Interaction of Openness with:
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Table 2
Economic Growth and the Interaction between Openness and Institutional/Regulatory Reforms
1
Cross-country panel data consisting of non-overlapping 5-year averages spanning 1960-2000
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV system estimator for dynamic models with unobserved specific effects and endogenous regressors
     Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -3.4019 ** -4.0229 ** -3.0202 ** -3.2063 **
  (in logs) 0.33 0.24 0.21 0.18
Human capital investment 1.2845 ** 1.5146 ** 1.7603 ** 1.2424 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.11
Financial depth 0.9632 ** 1.2870 ** 0.9063 ** 1.3196 **
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Inflation -0.3830 ** -0.3513 ** -0.5266 ** -0.2848 **
  (deviation of inflation rate from -3%, in logs) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Public infrastructure 1.5912 ** 1.6379 ** 1.4037 ** 1.0532 **
  (main telephone lines per capita, in logs) 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.13
     Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 0.0802 -3.7359 ** -3.5333 ** 1.6581 **
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.33 0.64 0.69 0.27
     Interactions:
TO * Governance 2.9617 **
  (governance: index from ICRG, 0 - 1) 0.87
TO * Labor market flexibility 8.9986 **
  (labor: index from DB, 0.21-0.80) 1.36
TO * Firm entry flexibility 7.4593 **
  (entry: index from DB, 0.25 - 0.94) 1.31
TO * Firm exit flexibility -0.8598
  (exit: index from DB, 0 - 1) 0.73
     Period Shifts:
Intercept (base period: 1966-70) 30.1810 ** 39.9023 ** 34.5819 ** 20.0764 **
 - 71-76 Period shift -0.2943 * -0.6062 ** -0.3485 * -0.6757 **
 - 76-80 Period shift -1.1737 ** -1.5945 ** -1.2628 ** -1.5267 **
 - 81-85 Period shift -3.4484 ** -3.7077 ** -3.6949 ** -3.5881 **
 - 86-90 Period shift -3.1087 ** -3.3740 ** -3.3734 ** -2.9243 **
 - 91-95 Period shift -3.9498 ** -3.9600 ** -4.0722 ** -3.5820 **
 - 96-00 Period shift -4.6800 ** -4.4676 ** -4.8611 ** -3.8035 **
Countries / Observations 82/544 79/523 82/544 78/518
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test 0.37                    n.a. 0.38                    n.a.
 - 2nd. Order Correlation 0.12                    0.28 0.13                    0.25
Numbers below coefficients are the corresponding robust standard errors. * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Source: Authors' calculations
Interaction of Openness with:
Firm entry 
flexibility
1  Our measures of institutional and regulatory reform do not vary, or vary little, over time.  Their direct impact on growth cannot be separated 
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 Firm exit flexibility
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Table 3
Economic Growth and the Interaction between Openness, Reforms, and Income
1
Cross-country panel data consisting of non-overlapping 5-year averages spanning 1960-2000
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
TO * Initial GDP per Capita 1.0067 ** 0.9237                ** 1.2174 ** 1.2644              **
0.21                      0.27                    0.30                    0.41                 
TO * Human capital investment 0.1200               
0.30                   
TO * Financial depth -0.2711 *
0.15                   
TO * Public infrastructure -0.1550
0.17                 




TO * Initial GDP per Capita 0.9340                  ** 0.3532 ** 0.2452
0.36                      0.16 0.35                   
TO * Governance -0.7291
  (governance: index from ICRG, 0 - 1) 1.36                     
TO * Labor market flexibility 9.5158 **
  (labor: index from DB, 0.21-0.80) 1.39
TO * Firm entry flexibility 6.3057 **
  (entry: index from DB, 0.25 - 0.94) 2.04                   
Countries / Observations 82/544 79/523 82/544
Source: Authors' calculations
Interaction of Openness with:
Numbers below coefficients are the corresponding robust standard errors. * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent 
level.
1  Each column in the table is part of a larger regression which includes the same control variables as tables 1 and 2 but that 
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Figure 2
Growth Effect of Trade Openness as a Function of Complementary Reforms*
*Notes: 
   1. The solid lines show the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the log of trade volume/GDP on the growth rate of GDP per capita.
   2. The x axis represents the range of the reform area in the full sample. The thicker line on the x axis (when applicable) represents the range of the reform area in the period 1996-2000.
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Appendix 1: Sample of countries






Finland Japan United Kingdom
France Netherlands United States
New Zealand
II. Latin America and the Caribbean (21 countries)
Argentina Ecuador Nicaragua
Bolivia El Salvador Panama
Brazil Guatemala Paraguay
Chile Haiti Peru
Colombia Honduras Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica Jamaica Uruguay
Dominican Republic Mexico Venezuela, RB
III. Asia (12 countries)
Bangladesh Korea, Rep. Philippines
China Malaysia Singapore
India Pakistan Sri Lanka
Indonesia Papua New Guinea Thailand
IV. Middle East and North Africa (9 countries)
Algeria Israel Syria, Arab Rep.
Egypt, Arab Rep. Jordan Tunisia
Iran, Islamic Rep. Morocco Turkey
V. Sub-Saharan Africa (18 countries)
Burkina Faso Ghana Senegal
Botswana Kenya Sierra Leone
Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar South Africa
Congo, Rep. Malawi Togo
Congo, Democratic  Rep. Niger Zambia
Gambia, The Nigeria Zimbabwe  37 
Appendix 2: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP per capita. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank (2003).
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is 
in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank (2003).
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to that 
level of education. 
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World 
Bank (2003).
Public Infrastructure Telephone mainlines are telephone lines connecting a 
customer's equipment to the public switched telephone 
network. Data are presented in per capita terms.
Canning (1998), International 
Telecommunications Union.
Governance  First principal component of four indicators (prevalence of 
law and order, quality of bureaucracy, absence of corruption, 
and accountability of public officials).
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Political Risk Services, 2003.                   
www.icrgonline.com
Financial Depth Ratio of domestic credit claims on private sector to GDP  Author’s calculations using data from IFS, the
publications of the Central Bank and PWD.
The method of calculations is based on Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).
Trade Openness Residual of a regression of the log of the ratio of exports and 
imports (in 1995 US$) to GDP (in 1995 US$), on the logs of 
area and population, and dummies for oil exporting and for 
landlocked countries.
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World 
Bank (2003).
Inflation rate Deviation of annual % change in CPI from 3% Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Labor Market Flexibility Weighted average of three indicators: flexibility of hiring, 
conditions of employement and flexibility of firing. The 
original index from Botero et al. has been rescaled to range 
between 0 and 1 and in order for higher values to indicate 
more flexible labor markets.
Doing Business, The World Bank Group See 
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer, "The Regulation of Labor", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1339-
1382, Nov.  2004. 
The difficulty of hiring component measures i) whether term 
contracts can only be used for temporary taskes; ii) the 
maximum duration of term contracts; and iii) the ratio of the 




The rigidity of hours component measures i) whether night 
work is restricted; ii) whether weekend work is allowed; iii) 
whether the workweek consists of five-and-a-half days or 
more; iv) whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or 
more; v) whether the annual paid vacation days are 21 days 
or less.
The difficutly of firing component measures i) whether 
redundancy is not grounds for dismissal; ii) whether the 
employer needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry 
for firing one redundant worker; iii) whether the employer 
needs to notify the labor union or labor ministry for group 
dismissals iv) whether the employer needs approval from the 
labor union or labor ministry for firing one redundant worker 
v) whether the employer needs approval from the labor union 
or the labor ministry for group dismissals; vi) whether the 
law mandates training or replacement prior to dismissal vii) 
whether the law mandates training or replacement prior to 
dismissal vii) whether priority rules apply for dismissals; viii) 
whether priority rules apply for re-employment.
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Appendix 2 (continued): Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Firm Entry Flexibility Composed of four indicators: 
1) Entry procedures: The number of different procedures that 
a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, 
i.e.  to start operating as a legal entity.  The data cover (1) 
procedures that are always required; (2) procedures that are 
generally required but that can be avoided in exceptional 
cases or for exceptional types of businesses.
Doing Business, The World Bank Group See 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, "The Regulation of Entry", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 117, 1-37, Feb.  2002. 
http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness
2) Entry days: The average duration estimated necessary to 
complete a procedure.  The fastest procedure (independent of 
cost) is chosen.  It is assumed that the entrepreneur 
completes the procedure in the most efficient way, ignoring 
the time that the entrepreneur spends in information gathering.
3) Entry costs: Costs associated with starting-up a business, 
based on the texts of the Company Law, the Commercial 
Code, or specific regulations.  If there are conflicting sources 
and the laws are not completely clear, the most authoritative 
source is used.  If the sources have the same rank the source 
indicating the most costly procedure is used.  In the absence 
of express legal fee schedules, a governmental officer’s 
estimate is taken as an official source.  If several sources 
have different estimates, the median reported value is used.  
In the absence of government officer's estimates, estimates of 
incorporation lawyers are used instead.  If these differ, the 
median reported value is computed.  In all cases, the cost 
estimate excludes bribes.
4) Entry regulations: i) Very Low: existing regulations 
straightforward and applied uniformly to all businesses; 
regulations not much of a burden for business; corruption 
nearly nonexistent. ii) Low: simple licensing procedures; 
existing regulations relatively straightforward and applied 
uniformly most of the time, but burdensome in some 
instances; corruption possible but rare iii) Moderate: 
complicated licensing procedure; regulations impose 
substantial burden on business; existing regulations may be 
applied haphazardly and in some instances are not even 
published by the government; corruption may be present and 
poses minor burden on businesses iv) High: government-set 
production quotas and some state planning; major barriers to 
opening a business; complicated licensing process; very high 
fees; bribes sometimes necessary; corruption present and 
burdensome; regulations impose a great burden on business 
v) Very High: Government impedes the creation of new 
businesses; corruption rampant; regulations applied randomly
The Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage 
Foundation Based on: Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Commerce and Country Report, 
2001 and 2002, U.S.  Department of State, 
Country Commercial Guide 24 and Country 
Reports on Economic Policy and Trade 
Practices. See O’Driscoll, G., E. Feulner, and 
M. A. O’Grady (2003). 
Firm Exit Flexibility Composed of three indicators: 1) A measure that documents 
the success in reaching the three goals of insolvency, as 
stated in Hart (1999).  It is calculated as the simple average 
of the cost of insolvency (rescaled from 0 to 100, where 
higher scores indicate less cost), time of insolvency (rescaled 
from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate less time), the 
observance of absolute priority of claims, and the efficient 
outcome achieved.  A score 100 on the index means perfect 
efficiency. 2) The cost of the entire bankruptcy process, 
including court costs, insolvency practitioners' costs, the cost 
of independent assessors, lawyers, accountants, etc.  In all 
cases, the cost estimate excludes bribes.  
Doing Business, The World Bank                       
See Djankov, Simeon, Oliver Hart, Tatiana 
Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer, "Efficiency in 
Bankruptcy", working paper, Department of 
Economics, Harvard University, July 2003.
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Appendix 2 (continued): Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
The cost figures are averages of the estimates in a multiple-
choice question, where the respondents choose among the 
following options: 0-2 percent, 3-5 percent, 6-10 percent, 11-
25 percent, 26-50 percent, and more than 50 percent of the 
insolvency estate value. 3) The degree to which the court 
drives insolvency proceedings.  It is an average of three 
indicators: whether the court appoints and replaces the 
insolvency administrator with no restrictions imposed by law, 
whether the reports of the administrator are accessible only to 
the court and not creditors, and whether the court decides on 
the adoption of the rehabilitation plan.  The index is scaled 
from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate more court 
involvement in the insolvency process. 
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Authors’ construction.  
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